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Karol Wolfke had a profound interest in questions of international 
law-making. His seminal work dealt with international customary law and its 
two constituent elements, i.e. practice and its acceptance as law.1 Wolfke 
perceived that relevant practice was not limited to State practice sensu stricto, 
and he analysed, in particular, how the practice of International Organisations 
contributed to international law-making.2 International courts, while in 
principle ‘confined to ascertaining and applying law’, may by their decisions 
either ‘paralyse the development’ of a customary rule or ‘accelerate its 
ripening’.3 Practice alone, however, does not suffice to create a rule of law. 
Wolfke firmly upheld that any practice must be accepted by States in order to 
create law. While customary law does not require explicit consent, a 
consensual element in the form of ‘presumed acceptance’ is needed.4 This 
view has been recently confirmed by the International Law Commission in its 
draft conclusions on the identification of customary international law.5 
In fact, customary law and treaty law both rely on explicit or implicit 
state consent. Whereas explicit state consent is needed for a treaty to enter 
into force, implicit state consent informs its future evolution. Article 31(3)(b) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states as a general 
rule of interpretation that ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
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interpretation’ shall be taken into account. Thus, a practice accepted as law 
may either inform the interpretation of a treaty or create a new norm of 
customary law. The dividing line between treaty interpretation and creation 
of a new norm is difficult to draw. A striking example is Article 27(3) UN 
Charter. Whilst the text of the norm seems to indicate that Security Council 
resolutions may only be adopted with the affirmative vote of all five 
permanent members, constant Security Council practice merely recognises a 
veto right. According to this practice, which is now widely accepted as law, 
simple abstentions do not hinder a resolution from being adopted. This may 
be seen either as a far reaching interpretation of Article 27(3) UN Charter or, 
as Karol Wolfke did,6 as a Charter modification through subsequent 
customary law. Anyhow, Wolfke is right in stating that treaties may, with 
time, ‘become overgrown with practice of their implementation, more or less 
changing their original content.’7 
Evolution through subsequent practice is particularly marked in 
international human rights law, where international human rights bodies 
produce abundant practice. Here, the question arises as to whether the practice 
of these bodies alone suffices to determine the content of international human 
rights obligations or whether organ practice must be backed up by state 
practice or forms of implicit state consent. This question shall be analysed 
with regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) of 13 December 20068 and the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CeeRPD) established under 34 CRPD. Although the 
Convention is only ten years old, its Committee has already produced quite 
an important corpus of practice, and it has shown its willingness to construe 
the Convention in a rigorous way which makes important parts of current 
domestic state practice with regard to persons with disabilities illegal. 
Section II introduces the CeeRPD and its practice before the law-
making potential of CeeRPD documents is analysed in Sections III-V. Section 
III starts from the formal status of CeeRPD documents under the CRPD and 
Section IV explores their relevance as a subsidiary source before Section V 
considers them under the aspects of practice and State consent. Finally, some 
conclusions can be drawn in Section VI. 
 
 
I. THE COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES 
 
According to Art. 34(2) CRPD, the Committee is composed of 18 
experts. Art. 34(3) CRPD informs the selection process: Committee members 
‘shall be of high moral standing and recognized competence and experience 
in the field covered by’ the CRPD, i.e. not necessarily lawyers; States parties 
are called upon to nominate their candidates in close consultation with 
organisations representing persons with disabilities, and to actively involve 
persons with disabilities. This selection procedure guarantees the special 
expertise of Committee members and it results in the great majority of 
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Committee members living with disabilities themselves.9 It may be taken for 
granted that persons acquainted with disabilities are particularly enabled to 
perceive not only the special needs of persons with disabilities but also 
structural discrimination which may be deeply rooted in society. 
Like other UN treaty bodies, the CeeRPD has three main tasks: The 
examination of State reports under Article 36 CRPD, the examination of 
individual communications under the CRPD Optional Protocol of 13 
December 200610 and the preparation of so called General Comments under 
Article 39 CRPD. Among the various documents produced by the Committee, 
three types are particularly important: So called General Observations on 
State reports, so called Views on individual communications and the General 
Comments under Article 39 CRPD. While this terminology fully complies 
with the practice of other UN treaty bodies, it cannot be found in the CRPD. 
Rather, the Convention provides for ‘suggestions and general 
recommendations’ to be made by the Committee under Articles 36 (1) and 
39, whereas Article 5 Optional Protocol refers to ‘suggestions and 
recommendations’ to be given after the examination of an individual 
communication. 
So far, the Committee has adopted two General Comments on the 
equal recognition before the law11 and on accessibility12. Moreover, eleven 
individual communications procedures were concluded by the end of 2015. 
Three communications were declared inadmissible.13 Two other 
communications were held to be unfounded.14 In six cases, the Committee 
concluded that there had been violations of the Convention. In two cases, the 
Committee criticised that persons with visual impairments had insufficient 
access to public services.15 Sweden was reprehended for having refused a 
building permit for a hydrotherapy pool without paying attention to the 
special needs of a physically disabled person16 and Argentina for not 
providing reasonable accommodation for prisoners with disabilities.17 
Hungary was criticised for withholding the right to vote in case of certain 
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mental or intellectual disabilities18 and Germany for insufficient measures to 
facilitate inclusion in the labour market.19 
Finally, the Committee has considered a series of State reports.20 
Poland has presented its first State report in 2014,21 but the report has not yet 
been considered. 
Among the Views on individual communications, the case of Bujdosó 
ea v Hungary22 is particularly interesting for the purposes of the present 
contribution, because the Committee strictly excluded any exception to the 
right to vote related to any kind of disability. Thereby, the Committee 
implicitly rejected a common practice shared by many States to exclude the 
right to vote in case of mental or intellectual incapacity. According to Section 
13(2) of the German Federal Elections Act (Bundeswahlgesetz), for instance, 
those who are placed under guardianship for all kind of affairs according to 
the German Civil Code do not have the right to vote. The same is true for 
incapacitated persons in Poland.23 It is quite clear that the Committee holds 
all these restrictions on voting rights to be incompatible with Article 29 
CRPD. This results both from the Concluding Observations on the first 
German State report24 and from General Comment No 1 (2014) on equal 
recognition before the law.25 
Such a strict approach, which contradicts widespread state practice, is 
not confined to questions of voting rights. Rather, it follows from General 
Comment No 1 (2014) that the Committee strictly rejects any incapacitation 
of persons related to a disability and any form of substitute decision making 
for persons with disabilities.26 In doing so, the Committee is well aware that 
general state practice is different. In fact, the Committee summarises in 
General Comment No 1 that most States examined exclude legal capacity in 
case of a perceived mental incapacity, which the Committee holds to be 
discriminatory.27 
A last example of a rigorous approach not covered by State practice 
relates to involuntary confinement. In many States, mentally disabled persons 
may be placed in care institutions even against their will at the request of their 
guardian or another institution if certain requirements are met.28 Article 
5(1)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) expressly 
allows the deprivation of liberty in such cases, and so does the European 
                                                 
18 CeeRPD, Views of 9 September 2013, Zsolt Bujdosó ea v Hungary, UN Doc 
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).29 According to the Committee, however, 
any such form of involuntary placement is contrary to Article 14 CRPD.30 




II. THE FORMAL LEGAL STATUS OF COMMITTEE 
DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CRPD 
 
1. Committee Powers 
From a formal point of view, the Committee issues ‘suggestions’ and 
‘recommendations’ according to Articles 36, 39 CRPD and Article 5 Optional 
Protocol CRPD. This wording highlights the non-binding nature of 
Committee documents, even when they terminate an individual 
communication procedure. All UN treaty body individual complaint 
procedures have been modelled upon the example of the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), which was established under the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR). However, the respective 
Article 5(4) of the CCPR first Optional Protocol employs the term ‘views’ 
instead of ‘suggestions and recommendations’, thus giving more leeway for 
interpretation. Departing from this wording in 2006 indicates a clear intention 
to exclude binding effects. 
It is true that all State parties are formally bound to respect the 
substantial obligations laid down in the CRPD and that they have accepted 
the procedures before the Committee. According to the Human Rights 
Committee, its Views therefore ‘represent an authoritative determination by 
the organ established under the Covenant itself charged with the interpretation 
of that instrument.’31 This has led some authors to assume at least some sort 
of binding effect.32 However, this treaty based reasoning may not overrule the 
clear wording of the Convention. Even if one was willing to accept an 
evolutive interpretation of the CCPR with regard to HRC competences, this 
is not possible with regard to the CPRD, which is much younger. When the 
CPRD was adopted in 2006, the debate on the authority of UN treaty body 
views was well advanced. In this situation, the contracting States did not take 
up the wording of Article 5(4) of the CCPR first Optional Protocol. Rather, 
Article 5 of the CRPD Optional Protocol underlines the non-binding character 
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of these documents. The formal status of an expert body established by States 
parties in order to make suggestions and recommendations certainly confers 
a certain persuasive authority upon the Committee.33 States must not simply 
ignore these views but take them into account. Unlike a Court, however, the 
Committee does not have the last word on what the Convention obligations 
are in a given case. It is true that the last word does not rest with an individual 
State party, either, but it rests with the community of States parties. Together, 
the States parties are the masters of the Covenant. They have the power to 
amend it or to give an authentic interpretation to its provision according to 
Article 31(3)(a) VCLT. 
 
2. Composition and Procedure 
Under a functional approach, a body’s competences and powers 
should correspond to its composition and procedure. The UN treaty bodies 
have been assimilated to a certain degree to judicial organs,34 and Courts are, 
indeed, in a position to formally establish what the law is. This is reflected in 
their composition. Judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are 
expected to possess ‘the qualifications required in their respective countries 
for appointment to the highest judicial offices’ or to be ‘jurisconsults of 
recognized competence in international law’ according to Article 2 ICJ 
Statute. In a similar vein, judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia must ‘possess the qualifications required in their 
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices’ according 
to Article 13 ICTY Statute,35 and Article 21(1) ECHR provides that ECtHR 
judges ‘must either possess the qualifications required for appointment to 
high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence’. Art. 34(2) 
CRPD, which requires a specialised qualification in the field of rights of 
persons with disabilities,36 contrasts sharply with that standard formula for 
international judges. 
The special expertise with regard to disabilities corresponds to the 
limited competences of the Committee ratione materiae. Unlike a human 
rights court and unlike the Human Rights Committee, the CeeRPD does not 
have to deal with a wide range of human rights applying to different groups 
of persons within society. Rather, the scope of the Committee is focused on 
the interests and needs of persons with disabilities. The Committee shares this 
feature with other Committees established under specialised human rights 
conventions such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child or the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CeeERD). This 
specialisation entails a certain risk of one-sidedness. This risk has been 
studied with regard to the Opinion of the CeeERD in the so called Sarrazin 
case.37 According to Mehrdad Payandeh, it corresponds to the ‘institutional 
                                                 
33 See also Geir Ulfstein, ‘Individual Complaints’ in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), 
UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (CUP 2012) 73, 97f.; Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights. 
Between Idealism and Realism (3rd ed, OUP 2014) 267. 
34 HRC, General Comment No 33 (n 31) para. 11. 
35 UN Doc S/25704, Annex. 
36 See above text to note 9. 
37 CeeERD, Opinion of 26 February 2013, TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v 
Germany, UN Doc CERD/C/82/D/48/2010, paras 12.8-12.9; see also C Tomuschat, ‘Der 
“Fall Sarrazin” vor dem UN-Rassendiskriminierungsausschuss’ (2013) 40 Europäische 
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 262ff. 
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logic’ that a specialised body like the CeeERD in the Sarrazin case claims ‘a 
predominant role’ for the concerns for which it was created.38 This leads to a 
‘structural bias’ which makes the CeeERD underestimate competing human 
rights such as freedom of speech.39 Given its specific mission and 
composition, the CeeRPD is in a similar position.40 
Therefore, the Committee is not in a position to act as a court, and it 
is only consequent that the Convention does not confer judicial powers on the 
Committee. The Committee is not intended to be a neutral arbiter, but to 
promote the interests and needs of persons with disabilities. This task, for 
which the Committee is perfectly qualified given its unique expertise, may be 
described as lobby function or ‘advocatory role’.41 This may explain why the 
Committee frequently opposes widespread State practice by a rigid 
understanding of Convention guarantees. 
 
 
III. COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS AS SUBSIDIARY SOURCE 
 
According to the Human Rights Committee, its Views ‘exhibit some 
of the principal characteristics of a judicial decision.’42 In fact, decisions of 
international courts have a strong influence on international law making. 
They are not only binding on the parties of a given case according to the 
principle of res iudicata. Rather, Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute gives them the 
authority of a subsidiary source. Although precedents are not formally 
binding under international law, the ICJ has invoked decisions by 
international courts, and ICJ judgments in particular, ‘almost as being positive 
law’, as Karol Wolfke rightly pointed out.43 
Those who stress the quasi-judicial character of UN treaty bodies may 
be inclined to assimilate their law-making function to that of international 
courts and tribunals. According to Başak Ҫalı, the ‘interpretative authority’ 
of an organ does not depend on its power to issue binding decisions in a given 
case, so that the interpretative power of UN treaty bodies would be equal to 
that of international courts and tribunals.44 However, this view underestimates 
the impact of adjudicative authorities as laid down, for instance, in Article 
46(1) ECHR according to which all Convention States abide by the final 
judgments of the Court in cases to which they are parties. If state authorities 
                                                 
38 Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Fragmentation within international human rights law’ in Mads 
Andenas, Eirik Bjorge (eds), A Farwell to Fragmentation (CUP 2015) 297, 318. 
39 Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Die Entscheidung des UN-Ausschusses gegen 
Rassendiskriminierung im Fall Sarrazin’ (2013) 68 Juristenzeitung 980, 989; Christian 
Walter, ‘Der Internationale Menschenrechtsschutz zwischen Konstitutionalisierung und 
Fragmentierung’ (2015) 57 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
753, 757. 
40 See also Stephanie Schmahl, ‘Menschen mit Behinderungen im Spiegel des 
internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes’ (2007) 45 Archiv des Völkerrechts 517, 538. 
41 Schmahl (n 40) 538: ‘Rolle … eher advokatorischer denn richterlicher Natur ’. 
42 HRC, General Comment No 33 (n 31) para. 11. 
43 Wolfke (n 10) l45. 
44 Başak Ҫalı, ‘The legitimacy of international interpretive authorities for human rights 
treaties: an indirect-instrumentalist defence’ in Andreas Føllesdal, Johan Karlsson Schaffer 
and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes (CUP 2014) 
141, 143, 160-61. 
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disregard an interpretation given by the ECtHR or by another international 
human rights court, they risk repeated condemnations unless they finally 
abide by the court’s interpretation or eventually succeed in convincing the 
court to readjust its interpretation. This dilemma has become evident in the 
Hirst saga, where the UK persistently refuses to grant prisoners the right to 
vote. Meanwhile, the refusal to abide by Hirst45 has led to a series of further 
formal condemnations.46 If a treaty body is not endowed with judiciary 
powers, by contrast, States are in a better position not to accept an 
interpretation and to uphold their point of view. 
It is true that the Committee was established by State parties in order to 
make suggestions and recommendations with regard to the implementation of 
the CRPD. Given this formal mandate, Committee documents may constitute 
subsidiary means of interpretation within the meaning of Article 32 VCLT.47 
However, their persuasive authority does not equal the authority of 
international courts and tribunals under Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute. 
 
 
IV. CRPD EVOLUTION THROUGH SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 
AND THE ROLE OF STATE CONSENT 
 
Karol Wolfke’s studies on practice and state consent48 open another 
perspective. CeeRPD documents may contribute to international practice and 
thus to international law making, either through evolutive treaty interpretation 
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT or through the creation of 
customary law. However, CeeRPD practice does not stand alone. States also 
produce abundant practice through domestic legislation and jurisprudence.49 
So, even repeated CeeRPD practice is seriously challenged where domestic 
legislation and jurisprudence remain unchanged. It is important to see, 
therefore, up to what extent CeeRPD claims are taken up by domestic 
practice. If a considerable number of States were to abolish domestic 
incapacity legislation in general and domestic legislation on the incapacity to 
participate in elections in particular, this would be a strong argument in favour 
of the Committee’s strict understanding of Articles 12 and 29 CRPD. 
However, this does not seem to occur, so far. Rather, the Committee has to 
recognise that most States are not willing to follow its Convention reading.50 
Moreover, pure practice does not create law, as Karol Wolfke rightly 
confirmed.51 Rather, the practice must be accepted as law. Treaty body 
practice might be considered to be so important that States are under an 
obligation to protest if they want to hinder a corresponding legal rule.52 In 
fact, tolerating practice may justify ‘the presumption of its acceptance as 
                                                 
45 Hirst v UK (no. 2) App no 74025/01 (ECtHR GC, 30 March 2004). 
46 Greens and MT v UK App no 60041/08 and 60054/08 (ECtHR, 23 October 2010); Firth 
ea v UK App no 47784/09 ea (ECtHR, 12 August 2014); McHugh ea v UK App no 51987/08 
ea (ECtHR, 10 February 2015). 
47 Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 32’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary (Springer 2012), para 25. 
48 See above text to n 1ff. 
49 See also Wolfke (n 1), 77ff with regard to domestic law. 
50 See above text to n 27. 
51 See above text to n 4. 
52 But see Ulfstein (n 33) 97. 
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law’.53 It seems, however, that even in the absence of protest, treaty body 
practice can hardly be presumed to reflect existing law where it is 
contradicted by consistent state practice. 
Furthermore, other international documents must be taken into 
account. In Alajos Kiss v Hungary, the ECtHR had to pronounce on voting 
rights in cases of disabilities. The Court held that the interest ‘of ensuring that 
only citizens capable of assessing the consequences of their decisions and 
making conscious and judicious decisions should participate in public affairs’ 
was a legitimate aim for restricting the right to vote.54 Although the Court 
considered it disproportionate that even persons under partial guardianship 
were categorically barred from voting under Hungarian law, it made clear that 
serious mental disease could justify a bar.55 This differentiated approach was 
taken up by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) in its Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework of Elections. 
According to the Guidelines, restrictions may be reasonable and permitted 
where ‘intellectual disability or psychiatric illness … amounts to a specific 
mental incapacity that justifies withdrawal of suffrage rights.’56 The 
Guidelines do not present state practice sensu stricto but the ODIHR points 
out that its expertise has been accepted by the OSCE Ministerial Council.57 
Under these circumstances, there is no sufficient evidence that States are 
willing to accept a strict reading of Article 29 CRPD. 
Samantha Besson has shown the difficulties of legitimizing 
international human rights in the absence of corresponding domestic human 
rights.58 This makes the current practice of receiving and specifying 
international human rights norms at the domestic level important.59 Treaty 
obligations derive their binding force from State consent. This is the 
fundamental concept of pacta sunt servanda as enshrined in Article 26 
VCLT.60 Progressive readings of the CRPD, however, may only be grounded 
on state consent if there is either a substantial state consent with regard to a 
specific reading of the CRPD or if the binding nature of CeeRPD views is 
consented by States. Since CeeRPD documents must be considered as mere 
‘suggestions’ and ‘recommendations’, much depends on their persuasive 





Summing up, Committee views have persuasive authority. The degree 
of authority depends on a series of factors. The Committee’s composition 
                                                 
53 Wolfke (n 1) 48. 
54 Alajos Kiss v Hungary App no 38832/06 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010), para 38. 
55 Alajos Kiss v Hungary (n 54) paras 42-44. 
56 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Guidelines for Reviewing 
a Legal Framework of Elections (2nd ed, OSCE/ODIHR 2013) 22. 
57 OSCE (n 56) 2. 
58 Samantha Besson, ‘The legitimate authority of international human rights’ in Andreas 
Føllesdal, Johan Karlsson Schaffer and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Legitimacy of International 
Human Rights Regimes (CUP 2014), 32ff. 
59 Besson (n 58) 76. 
60 See Kirsten Schmalenbach, ‘Article 26’, in: Dörr and Schmalenbach (n 47), paras 11ff. 
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gives weight to its views as it is composed of eminent experts. However, 
unlike a Court, the Committee is not composed in such a way that would 
guarantee a fair balancing of rights of persons with disabilities with other 
community interests. This institutional one-sidedness distinguishes the 
CeeRPD from certain other human rights bodies such as the Human Rights 
Committee which may, therefore, have a higher persuasive authority. In fact, 
an expert body composed like the CeeRPD is likely to highlight the interests 
of persons with disabilities without attaching as much relevance to other 
legitimate interests. Moreover, as a body created by the CRPD and formally 
endowed with ‘recommendation’ power, the CRPD enjoys some formal 
authority. 
Authority also depends on pre-existing, actual or future state consent. 
An interpretation found by the Committee has high persuasive authority if it 
is grounded on large scale State practice which is a sign of State consent. 
Even a progressive interpretation which goes beyond actual State consent 
may acquire persuasive authority if it is accepted either by the State concerned 
or by third States. If, however, States constantly refuse to abide by Committee 
views and uphold a different Convention reading instead, the Committee’s 
persuasive authority is undermined. 
Finally, in the absence of binding force, the persuasive authority of 
Committee views relies on the quality of its reasoning. If the Committee 
succeeds in proposing realistic alternatives, which improve the situation of 
persons with disabilities without entailing excessive material or immaterial 
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